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Abstract: The paper proposes a novel principle of rational self-locating belief that
refers to the epistemic agent’s causal context. The principle is motivated and ap-
plied to some of the most-discussed problems of self-locating belief including the
Doomsday Argument, the Serpent’s Advice scenario, the Presumptuous Philoso-
pher problem, the Sleeping Beauty problem, and the problem of confirmation in
the Everett interpretation. It is shown to yield plausible verdicts in all these cases.
1 Introduction
In a typical problem of self-locating belief, observers figure out their ra-
tional credences as regards what the world is like by properly taking into
account the available self-locating evidence, i.e. the available evidence as to
where and when they exist, and as who among all observers. Whether some
bit of self-locating information is available to an agent can have consider-
able impact on her rational credences concerning matters non-self-locating.
Problems of self-locating belief have received increasing attention by philoso-
phers in recent years. The most widely discussed such problems include the
Doomsday Argument (Gott 1993, Leslie 1996), the Presumptuous Philoso-
pher problem (Bostrom 2002a), the Sleeping Beauty problem (Elga 2000),
and the problem of confirmation in the Everett interpretation of quantum
mechanics (Lewis 2007). (For overviews and comparative assessments of
different versions of these problems, see, for example, (Bostrom 2002a) and
(Bradley 2012) and references therein. All these problems are reviewed and
discussed in the present paper.)
The present paper adopts the following set-up for problems of self-
locating belief: in the first step, a set of hypotheses as to how the world
might be is chosen and probabilities Pr() are assigned to them. These can
be relative frequencies, objective chances or other probabilities arrived at on
grounds of systematic considerations (examples will follow below). In what
follows, I refer to the probabilities Pr() as non-anthropic input probabilities:
contrary to what Carter’s anthropic principle (Carter 1974) reminds us to
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do, they do not yet take into account any constraints on possible obser-
vations that arise from the fact that what is observed must be compatible
with the existence of observers. In the second step, the situation of some
(hypothetical) epistemic agent is considered who either has or lacks some
bit of self-locating information that might be relevant to her rational assess-
ment of the hypotheses at issue; finally, in the third step, it is asked whether
the agent’s rational credence cr(A) with respect to some (non-self-locating)
proposition A is the same as the non-anthropic input probability Pr(A) and,
if not, how it differs. In other words, in problems of self-locating belief as
set up here the challenge is to compute an epistemic agent’s rational cre-
dence cr(A), given the amount of self-locating information that the agent
has, from the non-anthropic input probability Pr(A). As we will see, in
many examples this challenge is far from trivial.
What makes problems of self-locating belief so fascinating is that any
suggested prescription for connecting the non-anthropic input probabili-
ties and the rational credences that appears to work well for some prob-
lems seems to run into trouble for others. For instance, the so-called self-
indication assumption (SIA) (Bostrom 2002a, 66), which can be interpreted
as a prescription of how to link input probabilities and rational credences,
delivers an intuitively plausible verdict on the Doomsday Argument, but
it also delivers a catastrophically implausible verdict on the Presumptuous
Philosopher problem. (Both are explained in detail below.)
The main idea of the present approach to connect the non-anthropic
input probabilities and the rational credences is the following: typically, ob-
servers can take over the non-anthropic input probabilities as their rational
credences by identifying the two, but exceptions occur whenever observers
are disoriented about their place in the causal order of observers, in which
cases they have to correct for effects that result from their being so disori-
ented. I propose a causal principle of self-locating belief that makes this
idea more specific and precise. The results obtained from this principle for
the problems mentioned are: (i) that the Doomsday Argument is invalid,
(ii) that the presumptuous philosopher is presumptuous (i.e. his reasoning
to be rejected), (iii) that the thirder view is correct in the standard version
of Sleeping Beauty, and (iv) that the Everett interpretation does not receive
automatic confirmation by arbitrary data.
Unlike the present work, most recent systematic work on rational self-
locating belief adopts a diachronic perspective that develops and evaluates
updating policies for rational credences in the light of newly won (or lost)
self-locating evidence. (For examples of suggested policies, see (Bradley
2011, Briggs 2010, Cozic 2011, Kim 2009, Meacham 2008, 2010, Moss 2012,
Schulz 2010, Schwarz 2012, 2015, Stalnaker 2008, Titelbaum 2008, 2013).)
The present work differs in that it focuses on the relation between the non-
anthropic input probabilities and the rational credences, which is not that
between prior and posterior credences given newly acquired (or lost) self-
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locating evidence. Working with non-anthropic input probabilities has the
advantages that, first, no prior credences are needed from which to com-
pute the looked-for posteriors and that, second, the question can be set
aside which observer stages (possible world “centres”, in the terminology to
be used) are successive stages of one and the same observer. At the same
time, working with non-anthropic input probabilities has the drawback that
uniquely determined non-anthropic input probabilities may not be avail-
able or that there may be several candidate relevant non-anthropic input
probabilities between which it is difficult to choose. Given these relative
advantages and drawbacks, the present approach should be seen not as rival
to diachronic approaches but as complementary, having its own comparative
assets and problems, which may be more or less pronounced depending on
the scenario under consideration.
The structure of the remaining sections of this paper is as follows: Section
2 presents the formal basis of the approach to be used. Sections 3 and 4
introduce two simple (conflicting) candidate principles of how to obtain the
rational credences from the non-anthropic input probabilities. Both are
shown to correspond to internally coherent styles of reasoning that may be
applied to various problems of self-locating belief (roughly speaking, the first
to reasoning that avoids the SIA, the second to reasoning that uses it), both
are also shown to have highly counterintuitive consequences. In view of these
counterintuitive consequences and in response to them, Section 5 motivates
and proposes the above-mentioned causal principle of how to obtain the
rational credences from the non-anthropic input probabilities. Section 6
applies this principle to the Doomsday Argument and the Presumptuous
Philosopher problem and shows that it yields plausible recommendations
for them, Section 7 applies it to the Sleeping Beauty problem, Section 8 to
the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. Finally, Section 9 closes
the paper with an outlook on challenges that remain.
2 The formalism
The formalism to be used here is a standard Lewisian one that identifies
propositions with sets of possible worlds. Uncentred and centred propo-
sitions are distinguished. An uncentred proposition p (scare quotes are
omitted for the sake of easy readability) corresponds to the collection of
(uncentred) possible worlds V , W , X, ..., in which it is true, and the un-
centred worlds themselves are equivalent to the propositions that describe
them completely. For a proposition p that corresponds to the collection V ,
W , X, ... of worlds, p is represented as the disjunction V ∨W ∨X ∨ ... .
Many uncentred possible worlds harbour observers, and these have their
own individual perspectives within the worlds they live in. It is common to
refer to the distinct points of perspective inside some world as its centres.
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There is no fixed and determinate criterion of what counts as a centre.
Typically what one takes to be a centre depends on the problem and context
at issue. For many purposes, one identifies the centres of a world with
the conscious observers who inhabit it, but sometimes a more fine-grained
distinction into observer-moments (Bostrom 2002a), i.e. stages of one and
the same observer at different times, is preferable. In the problem cases to
be discussed, there are well-established conventions as to how to individuate
centres as observers or observer-moments. I adopt these conventions for
convenience, but it should be kept in mind that the choice of centres has
nontrivial implications and is often a decisive move in setting up a problem
of self-locating belief. (The challenge of choosing an appropriate class of
centres in a possible world is the more generic reference class problem’s
manifestation in the theory of rational self-locating belief.)
A centred possible world Vi corresponds to an uncentred world V with
one centre picked out and denoted by the variable i. Centred propositions
correspond to collections of centred possible worlds, which means that they
can be represented in the form Vi∨Wj∨Xk∨ ... (where any uncentred world
V can appear with different indices several times).
Following David Lewis (see Lewis 1979 and, for an application to a prob-
lem of self-locating belief, Lewis 2001), I allow that uncentred possible worlds
may be decomposed into maximally unspecific centred possible worlds, i.e.
worlds V are equated with maximal disjunctions of centres Vi in the form
V = V1∨V2∨ ..., where V1, V2, ... are the centres of the world V . Only those
uncentred worlds that contain some centre (or centres) can be decomposed
into centred ones.
3 A simple credence-prior link
Self-locating evidence is evidence as to which of the centres V1, V2, ... in
some uncentred world V one might be. Let us start by asking what the
rational credence of being the centre Vij is, given that one is one of the
centres Vi1 , Vi2 , ... Vin . To tackle this question, let us assume that there
is a credence function cr( ) from which the rational credence of being Vij ,
given that one is either Vi1 or Vi2 or ... or Vin (while not knowing which),
is obtained as the conditional probability cr(Vij |Vi1 ∨ Vi2 ∨ ... ∨ Vin). A
straightforward, and in many cases plausible, answer is that one should be
indifferent as to which of the centres Vij on the right hand side of the “|”
one is, i.e. one should have equal credence in being any of these centres.
This suggestion is expressed in the following formal principle IND (where
“IND” stands for “indifference”):
(IND) cr(Vij |Vi1 ∨ Vi2 ∨ ... ∨ Vin) = 1n
where ij is one of the i1, ..., in.
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Indifference principles in the spirit of IND are defended by various au-
thors, for example by Vilenkin, Bostrom and Elga and applied in a variety of
contexts where self-locating evidence matters. Vilenkin offers his principle
of mediocrity (Vilenkin 1995) as a principle of typicality in cosmological con-
texts; Bostrom strives for more generality with his self-sampling assumption
(Bostrom 2001, 2002a,b) according to which “[o]ne should reason as if one
were a random sample from the set of all observers in one’s reference class”,
leaving open the reference class to be used (Bostrom 2002a, 57); finally, Elga
(Elga 2004) defends “indifference” as a weak form of IND, which applies only
if the psychological states of the Vij are subjectively indistinguishable.
Even the weakest of the indifference principles—Elga’s—has been sub-
jected to a sustained critique in the literature (for example in (Weatherson
2005) and (Schwarz 2015, Section 7)), and there is little reason to suppose
that IND is always attractive: there are certainly circumstances where one’s
evidence leaves it open which centre among several one is and where it is
rational not to be indifferent as to which one it is. Nevertheless, I suggest
that IND be accepted for the purposes of this paper as a working assump-
tion. There are at least three reason why this seems to be a good idea:
first, IND delivers plausible consequences in some simple scenarios such as
Bostrom’s dungeon (Bostrom 2002a, 59f., see also his discussion of two sce-
narios due to Leslie in Bostrom 2002a, 62f.), and it is not easy to come up
with a similarly powerful, less controversial principle to recover these con-
sequences while rejecting IND; second, in the examples to be discussed, as
will be pointed out, deviations from IND would have to be radical in order
to lead to verdicts that differ qualitatively in interesting ways; and, third,
due to its simplicity IND is worthy of exploration in itself, even if it turns
out to be nothing more than a first-order approximation to a more general
and more satisfying principle.
Applicability of IND is not confined to situations where one is certain
that the actual uncentred world is V . Using cr(Vi|V ∨ W ∨ X ∨ ...) =
cr(Vi|V ) · cr(V |V ∨W ∨X ∨ ...) we obtain from IND:
(GenIND) cr(Vi|V ∨W∨X∨...) = 1NV cr(V |V ∨W∨X∨...) ,
whereNV is the total numbers of centres in V . As demonstrated by Vilenkin,
Bostrom, Elga and many others, GenIND can be used to derive very inter-
esting results concerning rational self-locating belief.
As announced in the introduction, the present paper uses a set-up for
problems of self-locating belief that is based on what I call non-anthropic
input probabilities Pr( ), assigned to the uncentred worlds V , W , X, ...
Typically, these probabilities are either objective chances (such as those of
quantum events or of outcomes of coin tosses and other random events) or
(suitably idealised) relative frequencies. As it turns out, in all the scenarios
to be discussed here there are some probabilities that suggest themselves for
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being treated as the non-anthropic input probabilities. Examples of non-
anthropic input probabilities to be used are: a healthy couple’s probability
of conceiving a child when having intercourse, the probability that some
asteroid with well-defined boundary conditions will collide with the earth
and extinguish human life, the probability of a fair coin to come up Heads,
and, in the final example to be discussed, an agent’s prior degree of belief in
the Everett interpretation as based on philosophical reasoning while ignoring
empirical data.
In all the scenarios to be discussed, the main challenge is to determine the
rational credences from the non-anthropic input probabilities by adequately
considering the available self-locating evidence. One way to approach this
challenge is by asking under which conditions the non-anthropic input prob-
abilities just are the rational credences, given the available self-locating ev-
idence. The most straightforward possible answer to this question that I
discuss here is that the non-anthropic input probabilities directly translate
into the rational credences when one’s self-locating information is maximally
unspecific in that
(MU) cr(V |V ∨W ∨X ∨ ...) = Pr(V |V ∨W ∨X ∨ ...) ,
where “MU” stands for “maximally unspecific”. According to MU, if all
that one knows about one’s location is that one might just be any of the
centres in the worlds V , W , X, ..., then one’s rational credence with respect
to V is the non-anthropic prior Pr(V |V ∨W ∨X ∨ ...) itself.
Though simple and apparently natural, the principle MU has some very
counterintuitive consequences. In particular, in combination with GenIND
it gives rise to the notorious Doomsday Argument in its different versions.
Let us review a simple version of this argument: consider two hypotheses
H1 and H2 as to how many observers are ultimately going to have existed
(N1 according to H1, N2 according to H2). To simplify matters, let us
focus on human observers and assume that they alone are the elements of
our reference class (see Bostrom 2001, note 1, for considerations on what
happens if we drop this assumption). Next, assume that you are the n-th
observer ever to exist, where n < N1 and n < N2, i.e. you are certain to be
either H1,n or H2,n. Finally, let us assume that N1  N2 in that H1 predicts
that a fatal asteroid strike will lead to an untimely end of humanity, so that
much less human beings will have lived according to H1 than H2. Non-
anthropic input probabilities Pr(H1) and Pr(H2) are assigned to H1 and
H2 based on information about the relative frequencies of asteroid strike in
some (hopefully) well-chosen reference class of asteroids.
Given these assumptions, what are your rational credences concerning
H1 and H2? Assuming that H1 and H2 exhaust the space of possibilities to





















where Bayes’ theorem has been used in the first line, the definition of condi-
tional probability in the transition from the first to the second, GenIND in
the transition from the second to the third, and MU in the transition from
the third to the fourth.
Thus, based on MU and GenIND we obtain the result that your relative
rational credences with respect to the hypotheses H1 and H2 are inversely
proportional to the numbers of observers N1 and N2 that exist according to
them. A smaller total number of observers ever to have lived is confirmed
over a larger one. The effect persists if more hypotheses H3, H4, ... that
other numbers of observers are considered. It also persists if modest de-
viations from GenIND are allowed or the reference class of observers (i.e.
centred worlds) is modestly altered. Furthermore, for any choice of reference
class an analogously structured argument can be constructed with suitable
hypotheses H1, H2. Some version of the Doomsday Argument looms for any
choice of reference class and hypotheses considered.
However, the conclusion of the Doomsday Argument is implausible, and
wildly differing diagnoses have been offered in the literature as to what might
be wrong with it.1 To determine what exactly makes it so bizarre it is useful
to consider one more scenario that is similar to the Doomsday Argument
but highlights the counterintuitive consequences of MU in combination with
GenIND in an even more drastic manner. The example is due to Bostrom,
who calls it “Serpent’s Advice”:
Eve and Adam, the first two humans, knew that if they gratified
their flesh, Eve might bear a child, and if she did, they would be
1To name just a few examples of reactions to the Doomsday Argument, Norton 2010
challenges the Bayesian reasoning based on which the conclusion is derived; Neal 2006 and
Bostrom 2001, along different lines, hold that the problem is an artifact of an inappropriate
choice of reference class, while others, notably Pisaturo 2009, Lewis 2010 and Bradley 2012,
argue that the conclusion of the Doomsday Argument (essentially the last line of Eq. (1))
is sound and only apparently unacceptable. Dieks, in contrast, argues for rejecting the
Doomsday Argument along lines as if the self-indication assumption SIA, discussed here
in the Section 4, were valid (Dieks 2007), without committing himself to this assumption.
The considerations presented here are in line with Dieks’ account. The principle to be
advanced in Section 5 gives a systematic justification of why this does not commit one to
the SIA.
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expelled from Eden and would go on to spawn billions of progeny
that would cover the Earth with misery. One day a serpent ap-
proached the couple and spoke thus: “Pssst! If you embrace each
other, then either Eve will have a child or she won’t. If she has a
child then you will have been among the first two out of billions
of people. Your conditional probability of having such early po-
sitions in the human species given this hypothesis is extremely
small. If, one the other hand, Eve doesn’t become pregnant then
the conditional probability, given this, of you being among the
first two humans is equal to one. By Bayes’s theorem, the risk
that she will have a child is less than one in a billion. Go forth,
indulge, and worry not about the consequences!” (Bostrom 2001,
366)
The serpent’s reasoning is correct, given MU and GenIND, in complete
analogy with the Doomsday Argument. To see this, suppose that Adam
and Eve consider only two hypotheses (possible worlds): one, H1, according
to which they remain the only two humans ever to have lived, and one, H2,
according to which N > 109 humans are ultimately going to have lived.
Adam’s self-locating evidence tells him that he is the first observer ever
to have existed, i.e. either H1,1 or H2,1. Using this information, he can
compute the ratio between his rational credences with respect to H1 and H2








Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the probability of getting preg-
nant after intercourse is approximately 1/2, which translates into Pr(H1) ≈
Pr(H2) ≈ 1/2. Accordingly, Pr(H1) and Pr(H2) approximately cancel out
and the result of Eq. (2) becomes N/2 ≈ 109. Thus, if we grant the ser-
pent the use of MU and GenIND, we have to concur that Adam and Eve
should consider the pregnany risk as completely negligible (or, perhaps to
their chagrin, their abilities to have children as weirdly reduced).
The main source of the counterintuitive character of the results expressed
in Eqs. (1) and (2) is the factor N2N1 , in the third line of Eq. (1) and
N
2 in
Eq. (2). To eliminate it, one may either look for an alternative to GenIND
or for one to MU. As already announced, I will keep GenIND as a working
assumption and look for an alternative to MU. In the following section I dis-
cuss the prospects for identifying rational credences with the non-anthropic
priors given maximally specific self-locating evidence.
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4 An alternative principle
In this section I discuss a straightforward alternative to MU that elegantly
avoids the Doomsday Argument and the serpent’s advice. Unfortunately, as
it turns out, this alternative has highly counterintuitive consequences on its
own. In fact, as we shall see, it inherits the implausibility of the disastrous
self-indication assumption (SIA) (Bostrom 2002a, 66).
The alternative to MU is that the non-anthropic prior translates into
the rational credence conditional on maximally specific (“MS”) self-locating
evidence:
(MS) cr(V |Vi ∨Wj ∨Xk ∨ ...) = Pr(V |V ∨W ∨X ∨ ...)
for arbitrary centred possible worlds Vi, Wj , Xk, ... . The disjunction Vi ∨
Wj∨Xk∨... is to be understood as containing exactly one (arbitrary) centred
world Vi for each uncentred world V and, for each uncentred world that
has no centre, that uncentred world itself. Thus, according to MS the non-
anthropic prior Pr(V ) translates into the credence that one rationally ought
to have with respect to V in a situation where, for each world V , W , X, ...
that might be the actual world, one can exclude all but one centre Vi, Wj ,
Xk, ... as one’s own (“actual” one).
Considered by itself, the principle MS is implausible: why should the
non-anthropic prior—which one might characterise as the probability ar-
rived at by ignoring the self-locating evidence—give the rational credence
in a situation when one has maximally specific self-locating information?
Nevertheless, it is useful to consider the ramifications of MS as it provides
the most straightforward way to get rid of the implausible conclusions of the
Doomsday Argument and the Serpent’s Advice scenario. Appealing to MS,






This means that the ratio of the rational credences when having the self-
locating evidence “I am the n-th observer” (expressed as “H1,n ∨H2,n)”) is
precisely that of the non-anthropic priors, just as one would have expected.
However, besides being implausible in itself, the principle MS has the
unwelcome feature that, as already remarked, its consequences are the same
as those of the self-indication assumption in that it states that the rational
credence in some hypothesis is proportional to the number of observers that
exist according to it. This can be seen as follows (where I use cr(V ) as a
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shorthand for cr(V |V ∨W ∨X ∨ ...) and similarly for Pr(V )):
Pr(V ) = cr(V |Vi ∨Wj ∨Xk ∨ ...)
=
cr(Vi)
cr(Vi) + cr(Wj) + cr(Xk) + ...
=
1/NV cr(V )
1/NV cr(V ) + 1/NW cr(W ) + 1/NX cr(X) + ...
, (4)
where the first line uses MS, the second line uses the definition of conditional
probability, and the third line uses GenIND (where NV is the number of
centres in V and analogously for NW , NX etc.).









which implies, implausibly, that one’s rational degree of belief in a possible
world is proportional to the number of observers that exist in it. This
is equivalent in its consequences with Bostrom’s SIA. (Bostrom does not
rely on the distinction between rational credences and non-anthropic priors
as the present paper does and, accordingly, formulates the SIA somewhat
differently, as an assumption about rational priors. For practical purposes
Eq. (4) and the SIA are equivalent.)
The SIA’s unacceptable consequences are highlighted especially point-
edly in the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario:
It is the year 2100 and physicists have narrowed down the search
for a theory of everything to only two remaining plausible candi-
date theories, T1 and T2 (using considerations from super-duper
symmetry). According to T1 the world is very, very big but finite
and there are a total of a trillion trillion observers in the cosmos.
According to T2 , the world is very, very, very big but finite and
there are a trillion trillion trillion observers. The super-duper
symmetry considerations are indifferent between these two the-
ories. Physicists are preparing a simple experiment that will
falsify one of the theories. Enter the presumptuous philosopher:
“Hey guys, it is completely unnecessary for you to do the ex-
periment, because I can already show to you that T2 is about a
trillion times more likely to be true than T1 !” (Whereupon the
presumptuous philosopher explains the Self-Indication Assump-
tion.) (Bostrom 2002a, 124)
The philosopher’s claim seems indeed presumptuous, and following his rec-
ommendation would clearly be irrational.2 Generally speaking, given non-
anthropic priors of similar size for two hypotheses, it does not seem rational
2See, however, Olum 2002 for a defence of the SIA against the presumptuous philoso-
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to prefer one over the other with near certainty just on grounds that it postu-
lates vastly more observers. This, however, is exactly what the principle MS
bluntly recommends. By way of contrast, the principle MU recommends
cr(T1)/cr(T2) = Pr(T1)/Pr(T2) (i.e. non-anthropic priors correspond di-
rectly to the rational credences), which seems much more plausible when
applied to the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario.
To sum up the present investigation until now: The simple principle MU
is natural and attractive at first sight, but it runs into trouble in Serpent’s
Advice and leads to the Doomsday Argument. The alternative principle
MS avoids these problems but entails the SIA and, therefore, leads to the
disastrous conclusion of the presumptuous philosopher. Arguably, what we
need is a principle that coincides with MU in the Serpent’s Advice scenario
and the Doomsday Argument and with MS in the Presumptuous Philosopher
scenario, ideally without radically changing the Bayesian framework that is
used.3 In the following section I propose a principle that seems to fulfil these
expectations.
5 A causal principle
What might be the relevant difference between the Doomsday Argument
and Serpent’s Advice on the one hand and the Presumptuous Philosopher
scenario on the other, so that MS seems to give the correct answer in the
former and MU in the latter?
I suspect that the origin of our motivation to treat the two differently
lies along the following lines: in the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario,
we compare two possible worlds (corresponding to the two theories T1 and
T2) that are “ready-made” in the sense that no conceivable action might
contribute to make one rather than the other one actual. Thus, the credences
cr(T1) and cr(T2) are about which one is and always has been actual. In
Serpent’s Advice, in contrast, Adam and Eve embark on considerations as
to which world theirs is most likely to become, partly influenced by their
actions. For them, whether H1 or H2 becomes true (i.e. whether they will
have any offspring) depends causally on the actions they perform (or don’t
perform). Similarly, for humans in the Doomsday Argument who live before
the asteroid strikes (or fails to strike), whether H1 or H2 holds is a question
of which world theirs is to become in the future.
Let us consider the implications of these considerations for observers
pher challenge and Bostrom and C´irkovic´ 2003 for a (to my mind convincing) rebuttal.
Leitgeb 2010 offers an illuminating alternative version of the Presumptuous Philosopher
scenario that compares hypotheses which differ on the number of observers by virtue
of differing on the temporal extent of the universe (more specifically, on the number of
expansion/contraction processes that the universe goes through).
3See, for instance, Bradley 2011 for good reasons not to abandon Bayesian condition-
alisation in self-locating contexts.
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whose self-locating information is maximally unspecific, e.g., in the Dooms-
day Argument, observers whose self-locating evidence is H1,1 ∨ ...∨H1,N1 ∨
H2,1∨ ...∨H2,N2 . The considerations just offered suggest that observers with
such maximally unspecific self-locating information are much more seriously
disoriented in the Doomsday Argument and in Serpent’s Advice than in
the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario: in the former, they are unaware of
whether they are among those who can potentially influence whether H1 or
H2 is true or, in contrast, among those whose existence depends on H2 be-
ing true. In particular, they are unaware of whether they are among those
whose existence is potentially dependent on actions that, given who they
might as well be, they themselves might in principle be able to perform.
In contrast, observers in the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario whose self-
locating information is maximally unspecific are not similarly disoriented
because T1 and T2 are competing cosmological theories of which one is true
and the other one false once and for all, such that there is no way of how
any observer might conceivably influence whether T1 or T2 holds.
4
Now to the central suggestion to be made in this paper. The main idea
is the following: typically (most of the time in our everyday lives), observers
can take over the non-anthropic priors as their rational credences; exceptions
occur whenever they are disoriented about their place in the causal order
of observers, in which cases they have to correct for effects that result from
their being so disoriented. Let us try to make this suggestion formally precise
inasmuch as it admits being made so.5
Let us introduce variables Vα, Wβ, Xγ , ... (with Greek letters for the
indices throughout) to denote complete collections of centres Vi, Vj , Vk, ...,
and similarly for W , X, etc., between which no directed (direct or indirect)
causal links exist. For collections Vα and V
′
α from the same uncentred world
V there are no constraints or limitations on joint members. I assume that
whenever there are directed causal links between two centres Vi and Vj from
the same world it is at least in principle possible either for Vi to prevent Vj
4One can of course modify the Presumptuous Philosopher problem and set it up such
that, by assumption, it becomes at least in principle possible for observers to causally
influence whether T1 or T2 holds. As I argue below, a good claim can be made that
in such versions of the problem the presumptuous philosopher’s MS-style reasoning is
no longer presumptuous at all and the correct solution is analogous to the one in the
Doomsday Argument.
5All present talk involving such notions as “causal structure”, “causal order”, “causal
context” and “causal links” is meant to be understood as metaphysically non-committing,
in particular not as presupposing causal realism. If one accepts a non-realist view of
causation such as, for example, Huw Price’s causal perspectivalism (Price 2007), one will
have to interpret the terminology accordingly, for example, by tying causal relations and
structure to the causal perspective that happens to be adopted by the epistemic agent.
Making epistemic rationality perspectival in this sense might be a surprising move, but
there is no reason why it should be in principle problematic. (Thanks to an anonymous
referee for highlighting this implication of causal perspectivalism as applied to the present
proposal)
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from existing or for Vj to prevent Vi from existing.
6
In theory, it may often be difficult to decide whether for some pair of
centres Vi and Vj there are directed (direct or indirect) causal links between
them, for example if candidate links exist that are for some contingent reason
unexploitable for manipulative purposes. In such cases, there is no clear-
cut answer to the question of whether there is some Vα to which Vi and Vj
jointly belong. As a consequence, in these cases recommendations based on
the principle to be formulated will be ambiguous and depend on the chosen
interpretation of the causal relation between Vi and Vj .
In practice, however, determining whether there are causal links between
any two centres Vi and Vj is typically straightforward. For instance, in
Serpent’s Advice, Adam is causally linked to both Eve and (indirectly) to
his descendants (if there are any). As a consequence, the observers “Adam
in H1” and “Adam in H2” are each individually already of the form Vα. In
the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario, an example of a collection Vα is one
which includes the presumptuous philosopher himself as well as a number of
spacelike separated distant observers who are all causally isolated both from
him and from each other. Worlds V which do not contain any observers are
by definition themselves of the form Vα.
For the sake of simplicity I restrict attention to scenarios where within
each possible world V the number of centres is the same within each col-
lection Vα, Vβ, Vγ , ... from the same uncentred V . This suffices to address
(simple versions of) the scenarios discussed in the literature. In the absence
of this assumption, the principle I am going to propose is no longer consis-
tent with GenIND, so either it or GenIND will have to go in settings where
it fails. Fortunately, in all the scenarios mentioned and in those to be dis-
cussed the assumption that all Vα, Vβ, Vγ , ... for the same V have the same
number of members seems viable. (Dropping it is a natural next step to be
taken in future work, as the concluding section will argue.)
After these preliminaries, here is the principle I propose (“CP” stands
for “causal principle”):
(CP) cr(V |Vα ∨Wβ ∨Xγ ∨ ...) = Pr(V |V ∨W ∨X ∨ ...) .
The disjunction Vα ∨ Wβ ∨ Xγ ∨ ... includes collections Vα, Wβ, Xγ , ...
of causally isolated observers from distinct worlds V , W , X, .... If we
include a different collection α′ from one world, say V , we obtain a new
instance cr(V |V ′α ∨Wβ ∨Xγ ∨ ...) = Pr(V |V ∨W ∨X ∨ ...). Similarly, if we
simultaneously and/or alternatively replace β by β′ and γ by γ′, we arrive
at further instances of CP.
6Strictly speaking, Vi cannot prevent Vj from existing as a matter of metaphysical
necessity because both are centres within the same possible world V . The centre Vi may
well possess causal powers to prevent Vj from existing, it may just not exercise them on
pain of ceasing to be Vi.
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To understand the ramifications of CP, it is useful to compare it with
MU and MS. Crucially, CP reduces to MU if all centres in each world V ,
W , X, ... are causally isolated from each other, for in that case Vα = V ,
Wβ = W , Xγ = X etc. On the other hand, CP reduces to MS if all centres in
each world lie along one and the same directed chain of causal links between
observers, for in that case Vi = Vα for each world and each i. The next
section traces the ramifications of CP when applied to the problems of self-
locating belief discussed above by highlighting these connections with MU
and MS.
6 Applications
The principle CP is designed to reproduce the recommendation of MS in
the Doomsday Argument and in Serpent’s Advice and that of MU in the
Presumptuous Philosopher scenario. This section investigates whether and,
if so, how it does so.
Uncontroversially, in the Serpent’s Advice scenario, directed (direct or
indirect) causal links exist between Adam and Eve on the one hand and their
descendants, i.e. all the later observers. In accordance with the remarks
made at the end of the previous section, this reproduces the recommendation
derived from MS: Adam and Eve may not legitimately assume that the risk of
Eve’s getting pregnant is negligible, so Adam’s rational credences, knowing
that he is the first observer ever to have existed, are cr(H1|H1,1 ∨H2,1) =
Pr(H1) and cr(H2|H1,1 ∨H2,1) = Pr(H2).
Similarly, observers in the Doomsday scenario whose birth rank n it
consistent with both H1 and H2 may in principle causally influence later
observers, so their rational credences, according to CP, are cr(H1|H1,n ∨
H2,n) = Pr(H1) and cr(H2|H1,n∨H2,n) = Pr(H2). So, according to CP the
Doomsday Argument fails.
Evidently, the recommendation that we wish to receive from CP for the
Presumptuous Philosopher scenario is that the presumptuous philosopher’s
attitude is indeed presumptuous and that MU, rather than MS, leads to
the right result here. However, the application of CP is not straightforward
here since the story, as told by Bostrom or Leitgeb (see fn. 2), does not come
with a specification of the causal links that exist according to T1 and T2,
respectively.
To extract some recommendation from CP, let us stipulate that there is
one civilisation of observers according to T1 and a trillion of qualitatively
identical copies of that civilisation according to T2 in such a way that all
those copies are causally isolated from each other. There are different ways
of how causal isolation can arise: for example, it can be due to the fact that
the spatial distances between civilisations are so large that causal influences,
travelling no faster than the velocity of light, cannot possibly connect them;
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or it can be due to the fact that, as in Leitgeb’s modified Presumptuous
Philosopher scenario (Leitgeb 2010), different civilisations occur in subse-
quent expansion and contraction cycles of an ever expanding and contract-
ing cyclic universe, where causal influences are cut off (or are unexploitable
for practical purposes as a matter of principle) by the periodically occurring
big crunch/big bang-stages.
Considering this scenario, let T1,α and T2,β be collections of observes
that exist according to T1 or T2, respectively, whose members are all causally
isolated from each other. As a consequence of the assumptions just made, the
collection T2,β contains one trillion times more observers than T1,α. Applying
the principle CP yields
cr(T1|T1,α ∨ T2,β) = Pr(T1) , (6)
cr(T2|T1,α ∨ T2,β) = Pr(T2) . (7)
By assumption, the number of observers in T1,α differs from that of those
who exist according to T1 by the same factor as the number of observers in
T2,β differs from that of those who exist according to T2. As a consequence,
we obtain
cr(T1|T1 ∨ T2)




in conformity with our intuitions and with MU, in contrast with the implau-
sible result derived from MS (or the SIA).
But what are the recommendations of CP with respect to the Presumptu-
ous Philosopher scenario if we allow (direct or indirect) causal links between
the different civilisations that exist according to T2? According to CP the
existence of such causal links may have a nontrivial influence on the rational
credences, and—one may ask—shouldn’t the existence of such causal links
be completely irrelevant for the rational credences?
In scenarios where the observers that exist according to T1 and T2 are
causally linked among each other in complicated ways it is very difficult to
check the plausibility of the recommendations given by CP, for we will typ-
ically not have any clear intuitions about the rational credences. However,
there is an illuminating and important example that should be discussed,
namely, where the class of observers that exist according to T1 corresponds
one-to-one to a subclass of the class of observers that exist according to T2,
while the vast majority of observers that exist according to T2 (all those
that are not in the subclass) are causal descendants (or, in an alternative
scenario, ancestors) of those in the subclass. This constellation is realised,
for instance, in a scenario where essentially all observers are causally linked
among each other and T1 and T2 agree on the history of the world up to (or
after) some time t, such that according to T1 there are no observers after
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(before) t, whereas, according to T2, the vast majority of observers live af-
ter (before) t, all of them causal descendants (ancestors) of those who live
before (after) t.
Once the Presumptuous Philosopher scenario is set up in this way, the
recommendation given by CP is no longer the same as before. In fact, CP
now recommends that all those observers who live before (after) t and are
aware of it should align their rational credences with the non-anthropic pri-
ors, whereas those who are unaware of whether they live before or after
t should prefer the theory T2, which predicts a larger total number of ob-
servers, as if based on MS. Thus, with respect to this scenario, where T1 and
T2 agree on the history before (after) t and disagree on it afterwards (before),
the principle CP endorses the presumptuous philosopher’s recommendation
of the theory T2 that predicts more obervers.
Luckily, this result, far from being worrisome for CP, speaks in favour of
its plausibility. This is easily seen by noting that the scenario just described
is essentially that of the Doomsday Argument: there as well the hypotheses
at issue agree on the history of humanity up to some time t, one of them (H1)
predicts the extinction of humanity at t, whereas the other (H2) predicts
many more observers. Introducing causal links between the observers that
exist according to T2 along the lines just discussed has taken us from the
original Presumptuous Philosopher problem to the scenario of the Doomsday
Argument. The principle CP advises us to treat these cases differently,
which—given our intuitive verdicts that the Doomsday Argument fails and
the presumptuous philosopher’s reasoning is presumptuous—is a virtue of
CP, not a problem for it.
7 Sleeping Beauty
No other problem of self-locating belief has provoked the same amount of
activity among epistemologists as the Sleeping Beauty problem. In its canon-
ical exposition due to Adam Elga it reads as follows:
Some researchers are going to put you to sleep. During the two
days that your sleep will last, they will briefly wake you up either
once or twice, depending on the toss of a fair coin (Heads: once;
Tails: twice). After each waking, they will put you to [sic] back
to sleep with a drug that makes you forget that waking. When
you are first awakened, to what degree ought you believe that
the outcome of the coin toss is Heads? (Elga 2000, 143)
Opinions are split over the correct answer. The two candidate rational
credences for Beauty (“you”, in Elga’s example) with respect to “Heads” are
1/2 and 1/3, both of which have substantial support in the literature. The
divide over the correct answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem is reflected
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in the fact that the principles MU and MS produce exactly those diverging
answers, and it is interesting to see which recommendation is given by CP.
To begin with, denote the three possible observer-moments (commonly
called HEADS-Monday, TAILS-Monday, and TAILS-Tuesday) by H1, T1
and T2, and assume that the coin toss is indeed fair in that Pr(H) =
Pr(T ) = 1/2 for the (objective) outcome probabilities. It is natural to
use these probabilities as the non-anthropic priors. The self-locating evi-
dence Beauty has at her disposal when awakening is maximally unspecific,
i.e. H1 ∨ T1 ∨ T2, which results in her rational credence
cr(H|H1 ∨ T1 ∨ T2) = Pr(H) = 1/2 (9)
according to MU and in
cr(H|H1 ∨ T1 ∨ T2) = 1/2 Pr(H)
Pr(T )
cr(T |H1 ∨ T1 ∨ T2) = 1/3 (10)
according to MS (where the consequence of MS Eq. (5) has been used to-
gether with cr(H|H1 ∨ T1 ∨ T2) + cr(T |H1 ∨ T1 ∨ T2) = 1). Thus, the
divide between MU and MS corresponds neatly to that between “halfers”
and “thirders” on Sleeping Beauty.
Let us first consider the standard version of the problem where the two
observer-moments T1 and T2 are treated as distinct stages of one and the
same observer on two subsequent days (Monday and Tuesday). There are
plenty of causal links from T1 to T2. For instance, if Beauty decides to have
her hair dyed on Monday, she will, as a causal effect, have dyed hair if and
when she is woken on Tuesday. It is true indeed that, in the story as told
by Elga, Beauty on Monday has no practical means of affecting whether she
is woken again on Tuesday. Nevertheless, we can imagine the experimenters
asking her on any day—as a routine question—whether they may carry on
with the experiment and wake her again (that is, if it is Monday and the coin
falls TAILS), or whether, say, she feels sick and prefers that the experiment
be aborted. Introducing such a question does not do violence to the story
or transform it into one that calls for a totally different assessment. No such
question could be asked if there were no causal links between T1 and T2 at
all, in which case the Tuesday awakening could not possibly be prevented
(or somehow influenced) on Monday.
Given the existence of causal links from T1 to T2, the principle CP coin-
cides in its recommendation with MS:
cr(H|H1 ∨ T1) = cr(H|H1 ∨ T2) = Pr(H) = 1/2 , (11)
which, when combined with GenIND, yields the thirder answer
cr(H|H1 ∨ T1 ∨ T2) = 1/3 . (12)
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This result is attractive: even though the 1/2-answer has some notable
proponents (such as Lewis 2001 and Bradley 2012), the 1/3-answer seems
to remain the dominant one in the literature and, as it seems to me, for
good reasons. Among the main independent arguments in its favour are the
following two that go back to Elga: first, if the experiment is repeated many
times, approximately 1/3 of the awakenings are HEADS-awakenings; second,
on the 1/2-view, if Beauty is told that it is Monday, her rational credence
with respect to HEADS turns to 2/3 by conditionalization.7 As it does not
seem to matter whether the coin is tossed on Sunday or Monday evening,
this means that Beauty, fully oriented about her (temporal) location, should
assign 2/3 to the outcome of a coin toss yet to be tossed being HEADS, which
differs from its objective chance and seems difficult to accept.8
The most important objection against the 1/3-view is that it is difficult
to see how its supporters can avoid commitment to the SIA and, thereby,
however grudgingly, to the presumptuous philosopher’s disastrous reasoning.
The approach based on CP avoids this problem in that, as discussed in
the previous section, its answer to the Presumptuous Philosopher problem
(modulo complications that arise from the presence/absence of causal links)
is that the presumptuous philosopher is indeed presumptuous, that is, as
if based on MU (halfer-style reasoning). Thus, grounding thirdism on CP
rather than MS avoids the only major significant challenge to being a thirder
about the standard version of Sleeping Beauty.
Besides the standard version of the Sleeping Beauty problem just con-
sidered there is also a fission version, where if TAILS comes up, Beauty
undergoes fission into two simultaneous observer-moments T1 and T2. In
the fission scenario, if both are indeed created in in the same joint fission
procedure, it is hard to see how any of the two post-fission Beautys could
prevent the other one from being created in the first place. (One might
immediately kill the other after the fission procedure has been performed,
but then both will have coexisted at least for a very short while.) If this
is the correct take on the fission version, the principle CP recommends the
halfer answer in it by dictating cr(H|H1 ∨ T1 ∨ T2) = Pr(H) = 1/2. Thus,
on an interpretation of the fission version where the two post-fission Beautys
cannot causally influence each other (at least not when starting to exist) the
7Some halfers, the so-called double-halfers (e.g. Bostrom 2007, Meacham 2008, Cozic
2011) dispute this. Meacham’s position as espoused in (Meacham 2008) is especially
interesting because he arrives at it on the basis of a proposed general principle of diachronic
self-locating belief called compartmentalized conditionalization. This framework, however,
is confronted with serious difficulties (see, for instance, (Titelbaum 2008, Section 2.7) and
(Bradley 2011, Section 9), and in (Meacham 2010) he has abandoned it.
8See (Elga 2000) for these arguments and (Lewis 2001) for David Lewis’ response sup-
porting the 1/2-answer; for a condensed systematic overview of the debate about Sleeping
Beauty, see (Titelbaum 2013); for an important recent defence of the 1/3-answer based
on a general Bayesian framework that applies to self-locating belief, see (Titelbaum 2013,
Chapter 9).
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principle CP treats the temporal and the fission versions differently.
Is this difference in how CP treats the standard, “temporal”, version of
Sleeping Beauty on the one hand and the fission version on the other hand
plausible? There are indeed important disanalogies between the temporal
and the fission version: for example, while there is only one copy of Beauty
in the temporal version, woken twice if TAILS comes up, there are two copies
of her in the fission version if TAILS comes up, each woken only once. As a
consequence, there is no obvious analogue to the long-run frequency argu-
ment in the fission scenario because it is unclear which of the persons that
are woken in different runs of the experiment are the same. Furthermore,
in the fission scenario it is not an option to perform the decisive coin toss
on Monday evening, for at that time the fission procedure must have been
made if it is to be made. As a consequence, Elga’s second argument—which
relies on the possibility of the coin being tossed on Monday evening—does
not carry over to the fission scenario as well and there is considerably less
motivation for thirdism in the fission version from the start.9
8 The Everett interpretation
The standard stochastic interpretation of quantum theory (SI) teaches that
in each case where a measurement is performed exactly one of the possible
outcomes is realised. The probabilities for the various possible outcomes are
given by their Born weights, which in turn are computable by the formalism
of quantum theory. In contrast to the SI, the Everett interpretation of
quantum theory (EI) teaches that in each case where a measurement is
performed all possible outcomes of the measurement are realised, but in
different branches of a vast Everettian “multiverse”, each branch associated
with its distinctive Born weight.
Since the EI is designed to reproduce the empirical predictions of the
SI in all but very special experimental circumstances that are extremely
hard to bring about, one would expect that evidence which confirms (or
disconfirms) the SI typically also confirms (or disconfirms) the EI to the
same degree. There are various issues about how empirical confirmation is
accommodated in the EI, and here I focus only on the most dramatic worry,
namely, that, since the EI predicts that all possible outcome really occur,
any arbitrary outcome confirms it, in contrast with the SI, which makes
very specific predictions. If this were true, it would mean that, as noted by
Bradley, “[t]he Ancients could have worked out that they have overwhelming
9See (Kierland and Monton 2005) for supporting considerations, using two competing
criteria of expected inaccuracy, that the temporal and the fission versions might best be
assessed differently and Wilson 2014 for support based on principled considerations about
the relation between chance and rational credence. Some diachronic approaches Meacham
2010, Schwarz 2012, 2015 arrive at the conclusion that the temporal and fission versions
require different treatments along entirely independent lines.
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evidence for [EI] merely by realizing it was a logical possibility and observing
the weather.” (Bradley 2012, 159) Clearly the case for the EI cannot possibly
be as simple as that, and the reasoning that leads to trivial confirmation of
the EI must be somehow fallacious.
However, as pointed out in (Lewis 2007), while the naive confirmation
view of the EI is obviously inadequate, it seems as if endorsing the 1/3-
view on Sleeping Beauty commits one to it.10 Put as simply as possible,
the argument for this claim is this: according to the 1/3-view on Sleeping
Beauty, it is rational for Beauty to prefer TAILS over HEADS when awaking,
related to the fact that there are more awakenings in the TAILS-world than
in the HEADS-world. Applied to the dispute between the SI and the EI,
an analogous line of thought leads to the result that we should prefer the
EI over the SI, just on grounds that it predicts more observer-moments,
corresponding to all possible measurement outcomes, which according to
the EI are in fact all real measurement outcomes. Fortunately, the principle
CP provides a rationale for not drawing this unattractive conclusion and for
retaining thirdism while rejecting naive confirmation of EI.
To apply CP to the SI/EI-dispute in a simple example, let us consider
the measurement setup studied in (Lewis 2007) and in (Bradley 2012): a
spin-1/2 particle prepared in a state where the Born weights for the possible
measurement results +1/2 and−1/2 of, say, spin in z-direction, are identical,
i.e. BW (+1/2) = BW (−1/2) = 1/2. There are four possible observer-
moments to be considered, namely EI+, EI−, SI+ and SI−, which can be
read as “I am in the Everett branch where the outcome is +1/2”, “I am in the
Everett branch where the outcome is −1/2”, “The SI holds and the outcome
is +1/2”, and “The SI holds and the outcome is −1/2”, respectively. There
are no causal links between any two of these observer-moments: occurrences
of SI+ and SI− are mutually exclusive, and both are incompatible with EI+
and EI−. The latter two correspond to distinct branches of reality, and it is
impossible for an observer detecting the outcome +1/2 in the “up-branch”
to influence the situation of an observer detecting the outcome −1/2 in
the “down-branch” (and conversely). In particular, whether or not, say,
the observer-moment EI− exists at all is not something that the observer-
moment EI+ can causally influence.
11
10Bradley endorses Peter Lewis’ reasoning together with its conclusion, arguing that
it is to be welcomed by the Everettian (Bradley 2012, Section 2.1). Wilson disputes
that Everettians should happily embrace the 1/2-view but also argues that they may
escape committing themselves to it by relying a principled distinction between chancy
and ignorance-based input probabilities (Wilson 2014). This is an interesting proposal,
which, in the light of the close conceptual ties between chance and causation, is perhaps
not unrelated to the present one. See (Bradley 2015) for criticism that it would need to
overcome.
11According to some versions of the Everett interpretation, split branches may in prin-
ciple recombine. Cross-branch causal influences may occur in these cases and, if we follow
CP, may have a non-trivial impact on the rational credences in more complicated situa-
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If we plug in the observation that EI+, EI−, SI+, SI− are not causally
linked and denote our non-anthropic prior assigned to the Everett interpre-
tation (on whatever systematic and/or interpretive grounds we have arrived
at it) by Pr(EI), the principle CP agrees with the principle MU in that it
yields
cr(EI|EI ∨ SI) = cr(EI|EI+ ∨ EI− ∨ SI+ ∨ SI−) = Pr(EI) . (13)
To see the consequences of this result, assume that a measurement of spin in
z-direction is performed, and the outcome is, say, +1/2. As emphasised by
Bradley, it is crucial to note here that the evidence gained by the experimen-
talist is not merely “There exists a +1/2-branch” (which would correspond
to EI+∨EI−∨SI+), but the more specific “I am in a +1/2-branch” (which
corresponds to EI+ ∨ SI+). Thus, the experimentalist’s rational credence
after having registered the result +1/2 is cr(EI|EI+ ∨ SI+).
The crucial assumption made by the Everettians is that the rational cre-
dences of being in the up- or down-branch are given by the Born weights
of the outcomes +1/2 and −1/2. In other words, Everettians assume that
the rational credences are cr(EI + |EI) = BW (+1/2) and cr(EI − |EI) =
BW (−1/2), where BW (+1/2) and BW (−1/2) are the corresponding Born
weights. Given this assumption (it is highly controversial whether Ev-
erettians are justified in availing themselves of it), the following result can
be derived by using CP’s instance Eq.Aˆ (13):
The crucial assumption made by the Everettians is that the rational
credences of being in the up- or down-branch are given by the Born weights
of the outcomes +1/2 and −1/2. In other words, Everettians assume that
the rational credences are cr(EI+|EI) = BW (+1/2) and cr(EI−|EI) =
BW (−1/2), where BW (+1/2) and BW (−1/2) are the corresponding Born
weights.12 Given this assumption (of which it is highly controversial whether
Everettians are justified in making it), the following result can be derived
by using CP’s instance Eq. (13):
cr(EI|EI+ ∨ SI+) = cr(EI+ ∨ SI+|EI) · cr(EI)
cr(EI+ ∨ SI+)
=
BW (+1/2) · Pr(EI)
BW (+1/2)
= Pr(EI) . (14)
Bayes’ Theorem has been used in the first line and Eq. (13) in the second line.
In addition, it has been assumed that no further interpretations besides SI
tions.
12According to Vaidman 1998, this is an instance of the more general basic (not further
justifiable) Everettian principle that rational credences should be assigned in conformity
with the Born weights conceived of as measures of existence. According to Wallace 2012
(Part II in particular), in contrast, decision-theoretic considerations can be used to provide
deeper justifications of this use of the Born weights.
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and EI need to be considered: cr(EI) = cr(EI|EI∨SI). The result Eq. (14)
is reassuring. It means that evidence that the outcome is +1/2 (or −1/2)
does not automatically lead to confirmation of the Everett interpretation
over the stochastic interpretation, exactly as it should.
As indicated, the remaining challenge for the Everettians is to justify
that the rational credence of being in some branch really coincides with
the associated Born weight. In the example considered, Everettians must
justify cr(EI+|EI) = BW (+1/2) and cr(EI−|EI) = BW (−1/2) as the
rational credences for arbitrary Born weights BW (+1/2) and BW (−1/2).
Matters are highly subtle here. To highlight just one of the complications
that arise, consider a scenario where only the observer who witness the result
+1/2 survives, i.e. where the only possible (post-measurement) observer-
moments are SI+ and EI+.
13 In the formalism used here EI is decomposed
as EI = EI+ ∨ EI− if both EI+ and EI− exist. However, if there is
no observer-moment EI−, the decomposition reduces to EI = EI+, which
yields cr(EI+|EI) = 1, differing from the Born weight BW (+1/2) 6= 1. If
Everettians are committed to this conclusion, their interpretation is empiri-
cally inadequate, which is bad news for them. In response to this difficulty,
Everettians might opt for amending the formalism by adding ghost observer-
moments in unpopulated branches such as EI− even if they do not really
exist. It seems difficult to judge whether this move can be made in a non-
ad hoc way without delving much more profoundly into how the Everett
interpretation should be fleshed out in detail.
On the more optimistic side, however, let us recapitulate the main moral
of this section, which is that CP allows to combine thirdism about the tem-
poral version of Sleeping Beauty with a view according to which the Everett
interpretation is not automatically confirmed by arbitrary empirical data.
The additional question of whether the Everett interpretation is empirically
equivalent with the SI whenever it should be—including less simple exam-
ples than the one considered here—is much more difficult and beyond the
scope of this paper.
9 Concluding remarks
I have motivated and defended CP as a promising recipe for obtaining the
rational credences from the non-anthropic priors in the scenarios considered.
My main goal, however, is not to establish CP as the ultimately correct way
to to this—due to its in-built limitations and vagueness it almost certainly
isn’t—but to direct our attention to the causal contexts of observers as
potentially relevant for the correct solutions to problems of self-locating
belief.
13An anonymous reviewer points out Lewis 2004 as an influential development of this
objection.
22
Future work that takes up this recommendation could elaborate on the
present discussion in at least the three ways: first, it may try to find a
version of CP that applies to scenarios where indifference principles like
IND and GenIND are implausible from the start—for example scenarios
where collections Vα and Vα′ that belong to the same uncentred V differ
in the number of members. Second, they may try to put CP (or a refined
version) on a firmer philosophical basis, for example by recovering it in the
language of causal graphs (Pearl 2000, Spirtes et al. 1993) or by investigating
it in the language of the Principal Principle (Lewis 1986).14 Third, they
may want to explore the consequences of CP (or a refined version) when
applied systematically to a wider class of problems of self-locating belief,
appropriately categorized, including, for example, the problem of empirical
confirmation in a multiverse where the constants of nature are different in
the various subuniverses.15
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